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The authors examine self-reported emotional experiences of indi-
viduals in a large probability sample of Americans, using two the-
ories in the sociology of emotions as lenses to apprehend social order
in emotional processes. Viewing emotions as indicators of individ-
uals’ positions in a three-dimensional affective space (e.g., Heise,
Smith-Lovin, MacKinnon), the authors find emotional station cor-
relates with a variety of social structural, circumstantial, and in-
dividual-level variables. Viewing emotions as the focus of emotion
norms and emotion management efforts (e.g., Hochschild), the au-
thors arrive at new postulates about how transformations of emo-
tions can be achieved in social support groups and other types of
social institutions. A further demonstration that emotions reflect
multiple sociological realities develops through the examination of
sex differences in emotional experience. The authors find that there
are concrete though subtle sex differences in the experience, struc-
ture, transformation, and contextual significance of emotions. The
analyses suggest complementarities between affect control and emo-
tion management that may have been overlooked in other studies.
Concluding a review of societal evolution, Douglas Massey said, “Emo-
tionality remains a strong and independent force in human affairs, influ-
1 The authors would like to thank Peggy Thoits, Brian Powell, Robert Sokol, and the
participants of the social psychology seminar at Indiana University, Bloomington, as
well as the participants of the first annual conference on research agendas in affect
control theory. The authors would also like to thank the sponsors of the GSS (1996)
Emotions Module and the AJS reviewers. This project was funded, in part, by the
National Institute of Mental Health’s Training Program in Identity, Self, Role, and
Mental Health (grant T32 MH14588) and by the Rockefeller Center at Dartmouth
College.
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encing perceptions, coloring memories, binding people together through
attraction, keeping them apart through hatred, and regulating their be-
havior through guilt, shame, and pride” (Massey 2002, p. 20). Massey
called for increasing attention to emotionality in sociological theory and
research, especially through the use of scientific approaches based on
proven facts. In this article we advance that kind of program by examining
self-reports of emotional experiences from individuals in a probability
sample from the 1996 General Social Survey (GSS). We provide sociol-
ogists with new ways of thinking about emotion and how emotion can
inform studies of social stratification, social conditions, and social trends.
We also provide insight into how organizations transform emotions to
motivate the behavior of individual participants.
Two theories from the sociology of emotions guide our analyses. Affect
control theory (Heise 1979, 2002; Smith-Lovin 1990; MacKinnon 1994)
posits that sentiments about role identities, behaviors, settings, and in-
dividual attributes and emotions interrelate through three dimensions of
affect. As individuals seek experiences confirming their sentiments, they
construct behavioral expectations for role identities, label or attribute
character traits to people in order to comprehend deviance, and experience
emotions that reflect successes and failures of the confirmation process.
The second theory—Arlie Hochschild’s (1979, 1983) delineation of how
emotions reflect status hierarchies—proposes that individuals work to
bring their feelings in line with culturally shared emotion norms. Organ-
izations use this capacity by hiring individuals to do emotion work in
order to market emotional displays that confirm particular status rela-
tionships. Emotion management also occurs in social support groups and
psychotherapy.
These two theories (elaborated below) do not exhaust the important
theoretical contributions within the sociology of emotions. However, they
are among the cornerstones of this subdiscipline, and they both focus on
relations between social structure and emotionality, offering complemen-
tary perspectives for scrutinizing data on individuals’ emotional experi-
ences. We conduct multiple analyses with the GSS data in order to
strengthen each theory individually and to explore complementarities that
may have been previously overlooked. We then suggest a broader frame-
work that unifies the theories in part.
AFFECT CONTROL THEORY
Emotions—along with identities, behaviors, settings, and attributes—the-
oretically are distinguished in terms of three universal dimensions of af-
fective meaning (Osgood, May, and Miron 1975). Evaluation assesses the
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individual’s sense that something is good versus bad, Activity indexes
whether an entity seems lively versus quiet, and Potency indexes whether
something is powerful versus powerless. Evaluation and activity consti-
tute a standard two-dimensional model of emotionality (pleasantness and
activation). The potency dimension arguably becomes a dimension of
dominance-vulnerability in matters of emotion—Kemper (1978), for ex-
ample, proposes that gains versus losses in relational power trigger feelings
of security versus fear or anxiety.
Morgan and Heise (1988, p. 29) analyze the affective meanings of emo-
tion words, find three dimensions, and conclude that “the circumplex [two-
dimensional] model provides a poor differentiation between anger and
fear, offering no framework that accounts for the difference between the
emotions of fight and flight. A three-dimensional model provides this
differentiation and offers an immediate and sensible explanation of the
difference: the emergence of fury as opposed to terror depends on one’s
sense of potency or dominance.” MacKinnon and Keating’s (1989) rep-
lication using Canadian data confirms that a three-dimensional structure
underlies the meanings of emotion words.
Fisher et al. (1985) ascertain that the evaluation and activity dimensions
are bases for distinguishing emotions and moods that actually are expe-
rienced, but the importance of the potency dimension in experienced emo-
tion still requires verification. We will examine this matter.
Affect control theory’s empirically validated model of emotion (Heise
and Weir 1999; Robinson 2002) posits that emotions reveal how an in-
dividual is faring in an interaction, both absolutely and relative to the
individual’s role identity. For example, someone who realizes he looks
foolish in an interaction will experience an unpleasant emotion, but the
emotion will be even more unpleasant if the person has an esteemed role.
Recurrent emotions reflect an individual’s station in life in terms of pre-
vailing roles (like being a spouse) and ongoing processes (like getting a
divorce).
Emotional stations might correlate with social structural variables and
with circumstantial variables. For example, the pleasantness of predom-
inant emotions might correlate with socioeconomic indicators that reflect
individuals’ customary status and power (Kemper and Collins 1990;
MacKinnon and Langford 1994). We will examine this possibility.
EMOTION MANAGEMENT THEORY
Demands to shape both the feeling and the expression of emotions operate
in every kind of social venue. Hochschild’s (1983) classic analysis revealed
that the airlines industry establishes and enforces corporate feeling norms
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that reify status and gender stratification in order to market the resulting
emotion product. Hochschild pioneered the idea that service workers have
to engage in emotion labor; in doing so, they must suppress their genuine
emotions in order to display corporately mandated feelings that are sold
for profit. Romantic partners also downgrade or upgrade each other’s
emotions in order to negotiate the structure of their relationship (Staske
1996, 1998, 1999). Specific kinds of transitions involved in emotion work
have been studied: for example, changing contentment to happiness
(Pierce 1995), calmness or embarrassment to anger (Sutton 1991), or shame
to pride (Scheff 2001; Britt and Heise 2000).
Emotions can be managed by adjusting the emotion label, the situation
in which the emotion occurs, the facial and gestural expressions associated
with the emotion, or the emotion’s visceral component (Thoits 1990).
Francis (1997), Thoits (1996), and Lively (2000) each demonstrate that
management strategies may turn collaborative when private management
fails because emotions are too extreme or too enduring or too remote from
norms. Scheff (2001) discussed the importance of instigating intervening
emotions—in particular, of generating anger when transforming shame
to pride.
Some emotions are close, allowing easy transitions, while other emotions
are distant, so that a transition requires social support and guidance. The
correlation of emotion experiences over a short period, like a week, pro-
vides an empirical indicator of how much work individuals must do to
move between feelings. If experiences with two emotions correlate posi-
tively across individuals, then the two emotions must be relatively ac-
cessible to one another. On the other hand, zero or negative correlations
imply an absence of natural segueing, so that transition from one emotion
to another may require movement through intervening feelings and social
support. We will analyze correlations between primary emotions in order
to see how movement between distant, mutually inhibiting emotions can
be expedited by passage through transitional emotions.2
DATA
The 1996 GSS (Davis and Smith 1996) employed a probability sample of
2,904 English-speaking adults residing freely in the United States. A ran-
dom subset of 1,460 respondents was asked questions from an “emotions
2 Inferring transitions over time from cross-sectional correlations is similar to making
causal inferences from cross-sectional data (see Heise 1975). However, we are not
proposing that emotions cause one another; it is rather our position that an emotion
can facilitate the experience of some emotions and inhibit others and that because of
this relation some strings of emotions should occur more frequently than others.
Sociological Realms of Emotional Experience
1113
module,” which consists of 90 questions regarding emotion, including
experiences in the last week with 19 different emotion states, details of
anger episodes, and methods of emotion management. We deal solely with
the respondents who received the emotion module.
Restless was included as one of the 19 emotion states in the GSS ques-
tionnaire, but Ortony, Clore, and Foss (1987) categorize restlessness as a
cognitive-behavioral state rather than as an emotion, so we removed that
state from our analyses and focus on the 18 remaining emotions. These
sample the populated regions of the three-dimensional emotion space as-
certained by both Morgan and Heise (1988) and MacKinnon and Keating
(1989), with the exception of the unpleasant-dominant-quiescent region
containing emotions like bitter and disgusted. The 18 states also corre-
spond to items in the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale
(see Mirowsky and Ross 2003, 1995).
Respondents receiving the emotion module were given the following
instruction for assessing recent emotional experiences:3 “Now I’m going
to read a list of different feelings that people sometimes have. After each
one, I would like you to tell me on how many days you have felt this
way during the past seven days.” Appendix A lists the 18 phrases for
emotions in this study, in order of presentation to respondents, and also
gives the mean reported frequencies of the emotions for males and fe-
males,4 along with the standard deviations and skews of the distributions.
The table in appendix A (table A1) reveals that only positive emotions
are reported to occur frequently.5 The standard deviations around 2.0
suggest that an interval of about four days is required to account for the
reports of two-thirds of the respondents. For example, even though the
male and female means for feeling contented both are just over 4.5, one
has to consider answers of four, five, six, or seven days in order to include
two-thirds of the respondents. The less frequent emotions have smaller
3 Some future surveys should try a shorter unit of time than a week for recalling
emotions. The GSS 1996 data deal mainly with memorable emotions, because short
flashes of feelings that respondents experienced six or seven days prior to being in-
terviewed most likely were forgotten. Asking respondents to report on the emotions
experienced in, say, the last 24 hours would reduce the recall problem, and the resulting
data might yield somewhat different insights than those contained in the data on
memorable emotions that we analyzed.
4 Many social scientists have theorized about temperamental differences between sexes
(e.g., Mirowsky and Ross 1995; Simon and Nath 2004) but not about temperamental
differences between races or classes. Therefore, in keeping with the existing literature,
we report sex differences throughout this article, but do not systematically examine
emotion variations for other forms of social stratification.
5 Respondents conceivably might be biased against admitting negative emotional ex-
periences. Pending a methodological experiment to examine the issue, we assume the
bias is small and proceed with our analyses.
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standard deviations because answers of one day or no days were common
with negative emotions. The skews indicate that nearly all of the distri-
butions are asymmetrical, with distributions for frequent emotions com-
pressed at the upper end because respondents could not report frequencies
greater than once a day and distributions for infrequent emotions com-
pressed at the lower end because respondents could not report frequencies
with time units longer than a week.
Appendix B (table B1) provides the correlation matrix of the 18 emo-
tions. Correlations for females are in the upper triangle and correlations
for males in the lower triangle. Twenty-nine of the male-female differences
in correlation are significant, which is about four times more than would
be expected by chance.
RESULTS
Study 1: Affect Control Theory
We begin by examining the emotion items as elements distributed in a
multidimensional emotion space in which individuals also have positions
that are close to the emotions that they experience frequently and far
from emotions that they experience infrequently. We use nonmetric mul-
tidimensional scaling (MDS; see Young and Hamer 1987) to unfold the
emotion space, positioning the set of emotions in such a way as to best
reproduce individuals’ reports regarding relative frequencies of their ex-
periences with various emotions. Subsequently we create indexes to trans-
late individuals’ reports about emotional experiences into measurements
of the individuals’ positions in the affective space in order to examine
how the individuals’ positions relate to social variables.
Identifying the dimensions of emotions.—MDS analysis finds the small-
est space that can maintain the relative ordering of a set of distances
between elements. We obtained Euclidean distances between emotions in
a hyperspace where each respondent constitutes a separate dimension,6
separately for 600 males and 766 females with complete data on emotions.7
Then we computed MDS solutions for reductions to one, two, three, and
6 Our Euclidean distances between emotions, computed with standardized scores, are
inversely related to correlations between the emotions. In particular, for both sexes,
the set of correlations among emotions correlates 0.995 with the set of Euclidean
distances, the slight difference between the two arising from curvilinearity in the
relation.
7 Seven percent of males and of females—those with some missing data concerning
their emotion experiences—were not included in any of the distance computations; the
included and excluded respondents do not differ notably in age, race, or kinds of
emotions reported.
Sociological Realms of Emotional Experience
1115
four dimensional spaces. A two-dimension solution maintains the dis-
tances between emotions much better than a one-dimension solution, and
a three-dimension solution is substantially better than a two-dimension
solution. A four-dimension solution does not offer enough improvement
to justify the additional complexity.8
We obtained an overall three-dimension solution by treating the male
and female distances as data from two individuals in an individual dif-
ference multidimensional scaling analysis (INDSCAL; see Schiffman,
Yaing, and Reynolds 1981).9 The analysis produced a single solution ap-
plying to both sexes and functions under the assumption that any di-
mension might be expanded more for one sex than for the other.10
An important theoretical question is: Do these three dimensions cor-
respond to the emotion structure emerging from measurements of emotion
meanings—the evaluation, potency, and activity (EPA) values given on
the right side of table 1? The answer could not be obtained by simply
comparing the INDSCAL results with the right side of table 1 because
the INDSCAL results might be rotated away from the meaning structure,
and the metric of the INDSCAL structure could be different than the
metric of the meaning structure.
We determined the extent to which the two numerical structures cor-
respond through a canonical correlation analysis relating the EPA values
on the right side of table 1 to the MDS coordinates from the INDSCAL
analysis. The canonical analysis produced three variates from the EPA
values and three from the MDS coordinates; correlations between the
EPA and MDS canonical variates were 0.97, 0.90, and 0.61, and all three
canonical correlations were significant ( ). The canonical correlationP ! .05
analysis thereby indicates that the experiential dimensions of emotion are
largely the same as the meaning dimensions of emotion.
We used the canonical analysis to rotate and rescale the MDS results
so as to optimally match EPA ratings, and these results are shown in the
first three numeric columns of table 1. Comparing these numbers with
the EPA values on the right side of table 1 reveals how the experiential
structure of emotions agrees with, and differs from, the meaning structure
of emotions.
8 Stress for one-, two-, three-, and four-dimensional solutions can be computed with
Kruskal’s formula 1: males p 0.128, 0.083, 0.055, 0.053; females p 0.100, 0.060, 0.046,
0.042.
9 The male and female Euclidean distances correlate 0.967.
10 All three dimensions are important for both sexes, but females emphasize the first
MDS dimension more than males do. Male weights are 0.90, 0.32, 0.25, and female
weights are 0.97, 0.18, 0.13 for dimensions 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
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TABLE 1
Coordinates of 18 Emotions in Three Dimensions
1* 2* 3* E† P† A†
Happy . . . . . . . . . . . 3.92 2.31 1.17 3.17 2.53 2.79
Contented . . . . . . . 3.58 1.76 .20 2.65 1.30 .31
At ease . . . . . . . . . . 3.45 1.49 .19 2.33 1.37 .29
Excited . . . . . . . . . . 2.86 2.47 2.91 2.74 2.38 2.88
Calm . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.81 .07 1.48 2.32 .98 .80
Overjoyed . . . . . . . 2.28 2.41 2.58 3.13 2.85 2.83
Proud . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.95 2.75 2.19 3.30 3.17 2.66
Outraged . . . . . . . . .77 1.56 1.94 2.58 1.40 2.17
Angry . . . . . . . . . . . . .96 1.10 1.63 1.95 1.34 1.78
Embarrassed . . . . 1.51 2.72 .76 2.28 2.63 .29
Mad . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.53 .09 .68 2.36 .95 1.66
Ashamed . . . . . . . . 1.63 3.46 1.59 2.90 2.87 1.25
Anxious-tense . . . 1.65 .11 .52 .03 .03 2.16
Fearful . . . . . . . . . . 1.86 1.71 .18 1.86 2.20 .72
Worried . . . . . . . . . 2.05 .15 .69 1.17 .69 .60
Sad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.51 1.84 1.66 2.72 2.29 2.46
Lonely . . . . . . . . . . . 2.91 2.43 3.63 3.07 2.93 2.65
Blues . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.48 3.42 3.68 2.28 1.91 2.09
* Dimensions 1, 2, and 3 are INDSCAL dimensions rotated and rescaled to match EPA targets.
Computed as where X is a matrix made of the three columns in the original INDSCAL1X 7 C 7 D
analysis, C is a matrix of canonical coefficients for converting X to canonical variates, and D is a3 # 3
matrix of canonical coefficients for converting the last three numeric columns above to canonical3 # 3
variates.
† Average EPA ratings. Values are means of the median ratings for each sex presented by Morgan and
Heise (1988, table 1), who reported (p. 21) that men’s and women’s ratings of emotions correlate highly:
E p 0.99; P p 0.96; A p 0.96. Anxious-tense is represented by the EPA values for anxious. Worried
was not considered by Morgan and Heise, so EPA values for worried are taken from the database of
EPA ratings described by Smith-Lovin (1987).
The points of agreement are major, when one compares dimensions 1,
2, and 3 of experienced emotions to the EPA values.
1. Pleasant and unpleasant emotions are separated by a gap, suggesting
that emotionality intrinsically is valenced (as argued previously by Ortony
et al. [1987], Morgan and Heise [1988], and MacKinnon and Keating
[1989]).
2. Pleasant emotions are distinguished by differing levels of activation
(e.g., calm vs. excited) and so are unpleasant emotions (blues vs. outraged),
which replicates a previous finding that pleasantness and activation are
important dimensions of experienced emotions (Fisher et al. 1985).
3. Pleasant emotions involve only small differences in domination
(proud versus calm), and no pleasant emotion intimates vulnerability, the
same as was found previously in studies of emotion semantics (Morgan
and Heise 1988; MacKinnon and Keating 1989).
4. Unpleasant emotions include both dominant states (outraged, angry)
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and states of vulnerability (lonely, ashamed, fearful), as found previously
in studies of emotion semantics (Morgan and Heise 1988; MacKinnon and
Keating 1989).11
The largest difference between the experiential structure of emotions
and the meaning structure of emotions relates to having the blues, which
seems to be experienced as much more unpleasant, inactive, and vulner-
able than suggested by EPA ratings of feeling blue.12 Also, the experience
of being outraged is substantially less unpleasant than ratings of the word
“outraged” suggest (and a smaller difference of the same sort arises with
regard to being angry), so experiencing rage may be less distasteful than
thinking about the experience.
Correlates of emotional station.—The dimensions of emotional expe-
rience that are identified in table 1 can be used to distil an individual’s
emotional station during the prior week by characterizing the individual’s
overall emotionality as pleasant or unpleasant, activated or quiescent,
dominating or vulnerable. Specifically, indices were created by converting
an individual’s reported frequency with each emotion to a Z score and
then summing or subtracting the Z scores in ways suggested by columns
1, 2, and 3 in table 1.
E p at-ease  contented  overjoyed  proud  worried  sad
 outraged  angry,
P p outraged  angry  mad  fearful  sad  embarrassed
 ashamed,
A p excited  overjoyed  outraged  angry  calm  at-ease
 sad  lonely,
11 While data from the 1996 General Social Survey was adequate for our scaling anal-
ysis, future surveys of emotion experience could be improved by including additional
emotions that were missing in the 1996 survey. In particular, emotions that are un-
pleasant, quiescent, and dominant—like bitter or disgusted—need to be included in
emotion surveys in order to better sample the range of potential emotions and to provide
a counterpoint to the unpleasant, quiescent, and vulnerable emotion of distress.
12 In reference to the term “the largest difference,” we should point out that some of
the moderate differences between the experiential structure of emotions and the mean-
ing structure of emotions may arise from problems in measuring emotion meanings.
In particular, anxious is rated as more active and less unpleasant than the experience
of anxiety seems to be, probably because some raters think of the sense conveyed in
“she was anxious to go.” The word mad is rated as more unpleasant, livelier, and
weaker than the experience of being mad seems to be, perhaps because some raters
respond to senses of the word relating to insanity. Feeling happy is rated as more active
than the emotion is experienced, perhaps because the word evokes connotations of
pleasure when presented as a stimulus.
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where E, P, and A refer to indices for Evaluation (experienced pleasantness
versus unpleasantness), Potency (experienced dominance versus vulner-
ability), and Activity (experienced activation versus quiescence),
respectively.13
Table 2 shows correlations of the emotionality indices with some other
variables in the 1996 GSS, the computations being carried out across
males and females combined.14 Overall, nearly two-thirds of the displayed
correlations are statistically significant. On the other hand, the correlations
are modest in size, as is typical in social structure and personality research
based on sample surveys.15
We expected age to relate to emotional quiescence because old and
young are adjectives used sometimes to rate Activity connotations of con-
cepts. As shown in table 2, age does indeed predict emotional quiescence,
and the effect is substantial, with age accounting for more than 6% of
the variance in emotional quiescence. Moreover, it turns out that not only
do older people experience more quiescent emotions, they also experience
more pleasant emotionality and more vulnerable emotionality. Age ac-
counts for 4% of the variance in pleasantness of emotionality—a greater
effect than from any other structural variable considered here. Age ac-
counts for somewhat less than 1% of the variance in emotional domi-
nance—a small effect but statistically significant.
We examined correlations of emotional station with socioeconomic var-
iables to see if emotional station reflects general structural position.16 Sta-
tistically significant correlations do occur. More education predicts greater
13 Exclusion of emotions from each equation is methodical. For example, embarrass-
ment is a valid indicator of unpleasant emotionality, but it is excluded from the E
formula because it also is an indicator of vulnerable emotionality, with no pleasant
vulnerable emotion to pair with it, so including it would build in a correlation between
the pleasantness and dominance indices. Scores on the indices correlate significantly,
notwithstanding our methodological precautions. For females E and P correlate 0.19;
E and A correlate 0.24; and P and A correlate 0.39. The corresponding correlations
among males are 0.12, 0.26, and 0.45.
14 We computed the correlations in table 3 separately by sex, and none of the male
correlations was significantly different from the corresponding female correlation
( ), when tested by Student’s t after Fisher’s r to z transformation (Winkler andP ! .05
Hays 1975, p. 653).
15 Kessler’s (1982) article on socioeconomic status and mental health, e.g., reports av-
erage bivariate s of about .02 for the associations of education, income, and occu-2R
pation with measures of depression, with slightly higher values (closer to .03) for
homemakers.
16 Past research suggests a relationship between roles and emotion (Heise 1979, 2002;
Robinson, Smith-Lovin, and Tsoudis 1994; Smith-Lovin 1990) and between role oc-
cupancy and distress (Simon 2002; Thoits 1987, 1986). Examining the emotional en-
tailments of particular roles is a complex problem, constituting another research study,
and is beyond the scope of this article.
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TABLE 2





Is older . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20** .09** .26**
Is more highly educated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .04 .01 .09**
Is in more prestigious occupation . . . . . .07* .01 .02
Has higher family income . . . . . . . . . . . . . .05 .08** .04
Is American Indian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .02 .07* .01
Is unhealthy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14** .03 .07*
Lives with many people . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .08** .12** .17**
Has frequent sex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .03 .08** .14**
Prays frequently . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12** .11** .07*
Believes people are fair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17** .13** .11**
Note.—The GSS 1996 respondent variables are, respectively: AGE, EDUC, PRESTG80, INCOME91,
ETHNIC p 30, HEALTH, HOMPOP, SEXFREQ, PRAY (reflected), FAIR. With pairwise deletion of
mission data, Ns vary from 1,242 to 1,427, except for PRAY and FAIR where Ns vary from 917 to 944.
* , two-tailed tests.P ! .05
** .P ! .01
emotional activation, higher occupational prestige predicts more emo-
tional pleasantness, and larger family income predicts more emotional
dominance. In all cases the variances accounted for are less than 1%.
Familiar race-ethnicity variables do not correlate with emotional sta-
tion. For example, the correlations of the EPA variables with being white
or being black all are within 0.03 of zero. However, being a Native Amer-
ican does predict emotional dominance to a small degree, as shown in
table 2.
Poor health might be expected to result in unpleasant, vulnerable, and
quiescent emotionality. Significant correlations of health with emotional
unpleasantness and with emotional quiescence do appear. However,
health is not related to emotional dominance.
The GSS includes a count of the number of people living in the same
dwelling as the respondent, and we correlated this with emotional station
because studies have shown that high social density has affective impacts
(e.g., Lepore, Evans, and Palsane 1991), as do related factors such as
marriage (Simon 2002) and active childrearing (Ross and Van Willigen
1996; Scheiman 2000). The correlations indicate that living with more
people produces emotional activation, emotional domination, and emo-
tional unpleasantness. Ignoring the possible diversity of feelings that these
correlations might indicate, the central effect of household density seems
to be increased anger (also see Scheiman 2000).
Finally we wanted to see if emotion station relates to behavior and
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opinion variables. We were able to confirm that there are numerous such
correlates by computing correlations between the emotion variables and
large blocks of GSS variables. (Such “data dredging” is a poor way to
build theory, but it served our more modest purpose of verifying the
research usefulness of the emotion measures.) Table 2 presents three of
the more intriguing findings. High sexual activity correlates with emo-
tional activation and with emotional dominance. Praying is associated
with pleasant emotionality and also with emotional vulnerability. Believ-
ing that people are fair (i.e., that they do not take advantage of you) is
associated with pleasant, vulnerable, and quiescent emotionality.
Sex differences.—The INDSCAL analysis revealed that men weight
the second and third unrotated MDS dimensions somewhat greater than
women do, which means that emotions are separated on these dimensions
more for men than for women. The implications are hard to divine from
the coordinates of the emotions on the unrotated dimensions. However,
we regressed distances between pairs of emotions entailed by women’s
MDS solution on distances entailed by men’s MDS solution, and the
residuals from predictions revealed a major sex difference in the solutions:
women have less distance than men between the emotions angry-mad-
outraged and the emotions blues-lonely-sad. Anticipating the results of
study 2, it might be said that women move between anger and distress
more easily than men do.
Sex is a structural correlate of emotional station,17 and all three cor-
relations (0.09, 0.06, 0.06 for E, P, and A, respectively) are signifi-
cantly different from zero at the .05 levels. These figures indicate that
being a woman involves a propensity to unpleasant, vulnerable, and qui-
escent emotionality. The correlations are small, however, such that sex
accounts for less than 1% of the variance on any of these emotionality
dimensions.
Study 2: Emotion Management
In the second study, we identify primary emotions through confirmatory
factor analysis (Joreskog and Sorbom 1993). Our initial model derives
from an especially systematic and inclusive classification of emotions pro-
posed by psychologists Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988),18 who distinguish
17 We withheld the variable sex from table 2 in order to focus on it here.
18 The Ortony-Clore-Collins (1988) definition of distress focuses only on depression as
reflected in the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (Mirowsky and
Ross 1995), without incorporating feelings associated with anxiety. While we realize
that most sociologists and epidemiologists would disagree with Ortony, Clore, and
Collins’s (1988) use of the term distress, we have nonetheless adopted this term in
order to implement their classification system.
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emotional reactions to events, agents, or objects, and propose that each
kind of reaction might be characterized by different emotion tokens. For
example, being pleased about a desirable event produces an affective
condition (joy) that might be recognized as feeling contented, happy, cheer-
ful, delighted, ecstatic, and so on. Since experiencing a primary emotion
leads to correlated reports of specific emotions, the primary emotion can
be revealed by subjecting the reports of specific emotions to factor analysis.
We allow that primary emotional states also may be interrelated, and
we suppose that difficulties in moving between emotions are related to
these correlations. We develop this idea by applying shortest-path analyses
(Rosen 1988, pp. 401–10) to the correlations among factors.
Identifying primary emotions.—The emotion indicators available in
GSS 1996 limit our analysis to Ortony et al.’s (1988) event-based emotional
conditions (specifically joy, hope, distress, and fear) and agent-based con-
ditions (specifically pride, self-reproach, and anger). Table 3 provides ad-
ditional details concerning these primary emotional conditions, including
our initial assignments of tokens from the GSS.
While the Ortony et al.’s (1988) scheme serves us as a theoretically
principled starting point, we do not try to fulfill it exactly. So, for example,
hope in the Ortony-Clore-Collins classification refers to “being happy
about an event” while the GSS question that we use as an indicator of
hope asks if one is excited “about something.” Additionally, Ortony et al.
(1988) did not mention the tokens of calm and at ease that were included
in the GSS and that were identified as emotions by Ortony et al. (1987),
so we established a supplementary emotional condition, tranquility, to
include these two tokens.19
Table 4 shows the specifications and results of our final confirmatory
factor analysis.20 This model is several steps removed from the initial
model based on Ortony et al. (1988), which fit the data poorly ( :2x
). The final model achieves dramatic improvement in the ratiodf p 4.57
(2.57) by treating only overjoyed as an indicator of the joy factor, by
19 Combining the tranquility factor and the joy factor into a single factor decreases
the fit of the initial model: vs. 4.57.2x /df p 4.72
20 One item was used as the scale-defining item for each latent variable by setting its
factor coefficient to 1.0, and the factor coefficients for other items were estimated from
the data. Latent factors were allowed to covary freely. Errors for individual items were
assumed to be uncorrelated. Given that all of our indicators were highly skewed, we
estimated the model using asymptotically distribution free (ADF) estimation in AMOS
4.0. Unlike maximum-likelihood (ML) estimation, which assumes a normal distribu-
tion, ADF does not impose an assumption of normality and typically generates reliable
estimates in large samples (Browne and Cudeck 1993). We also ran the model using
ML estimation. While the latent variable correlations generated by the ML were just
marginally different than those generated using ADF estimation, the overall fit of the
model was reduced.
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TABLE 3
Emotions in the Ortony, Clore, and Collins Classification System
Type Specification Tokens in GSS 1996
Anger . . . . . . . . . . . . Disapproving of someone’s blameworthy




Distress . . . . . . . . . . Displeased about an undesirable event [blues], lonely, sad
Fear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Displeased about the prospect of an event anxious-tense, fear-
ful, worried
Hope . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pleased about the prospect of a desirable
event
excited
Joy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pleased about a desirable event contented, happy,
[overjoyed]
Pride . . . . . . . . . . . . . Approving of one’s own praiseworthy
action
proud




Note.—Bracketed tokens were not mentioned explicitly by Ortony et al. (1988), but we believe our
assignments fit their classification system. Some of the tokens we list are slight modifications of the
tokens explicitly mentioned by Ortony et al.—e.g., “excited” in place of “excitement.”
moving contented and happy to the tranquility factor, and by separating
outraged into its own factor, called rage. Our analyses suggest that the
Ortony et al.’s (1988) classificatory system may conceal some important
distinctions in emotion, particularly with regard to levels of activation,
which they treat merely as intensity variation.21
Paths of transformation.—Correlations among the emotion factors are
presented in the lower triangle of table 5.22 As one might expect, corre-
lations within unpleasant emotions and correlations within pleasant emo-
tions generally are higher than the correlations between pleasant and
unpleasant emotions. However, correlations between pleasant and un-
pleasant emotions are not simply negative. Joy and pride correlate pos-
itively to a small degree with each of the unpleasant emotions, and hope
also is positively correlated with some of the unpleasant emotions.
The positive correlations between pleasant and unpleasant emotions
provide paths for segueing between unpleasant feelings and pleasant feel-
ings according to the theoretical proposal that we offered earlier. Emotions
correlating positively during a weeklong period may be relatively acces-
21 Ortony et al. (1988) assert that factor analytic and multidimensional scaling studies
of emotion are “uninformative” (p. 7). That reflects their commitment solely to theo-
retical considerations, as opposed to our commitment to improving classifications of
emotion through empirical studies.
22 AMOS yields correlations that are sometimes higher than zero-order correlations
among indices, a standard result when creating latent-trait models. We used AMOS
estimates for the correlations rather than computing actual scores and correlating them.
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TABLE 4
Factor Coefficients of Emotion Items in Final Model
Emotion Item Factor Loading
Calm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tranquility 1.00
At ease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tranquility 1.20
Contented . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tranquility 1.20
Happy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tranquility 1.06
Overjoyed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joy 1.00
Excited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hope 1.00
Proud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pride 1.00
Embarrassed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Self-reproach 1.00
Ashamed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Self-reproach 1.21
Fearful . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fear 1.00
Worried . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fear 1.65
Anxious-tense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fear 1.42
Sad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Distress 1.00
Blues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Distress 1.05
Lonely . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Distress .91
Angry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Angry 1.00
Mad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Angry 1.07
Outraged . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rage 1.00
Fit statistics:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2x /df 2.57
Incremental fit index . . . . . . .91
Comparative fit index . . . . .91
Root mean square error of
approximation . . . . . . . . . . .04
Note.— after listwise deletion of missing data cases.N p 1,361
sible from each other, and emotions correlating negatively may be rela-
tively inaccessible from each other. Building upon this assumption, we
offer an index of remoteness based on correlation coefficients to quantify
this notion more exactly (see the note of table 5 for the formula). If two
emotions correlate 1.0 then they have a remoteness of 0; if they correlate
0.0 then they have a remoteness of 10; and if they correlate 1.0 then
they have a remoteness of 20. In-between correlations are curvilinearly
related to remotenesses; for example, a correlation of 0.5 gives a remote-
ness of 3. Our choice of transformation function is pragmatic in that it
yields results corresponding to some observations in the sociology of
emotions.
Qualitative studies of emotion management support the usefulness of
our model. Thoits’s (1996) field notes from a psychodrama group devoted
to dealing with emotional problems contain a number of examples in
which participants were led from one emotional state to another. Although
each individual had his or her own set of issues (ranging from problematic
TABLE 5
Relations among Emotion Factors
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Tranquility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 5 15 16 16 18 18
(11 via hope) (11 via pride) (12 via joy) (10 via hope) (11 via hope and fear)
2. Hope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 . . . 3 4 7 9 11 6 13
(8 via fear) (9 via fear) (7 via fear)
3. Joy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 .45 . . . 4 6 8 7 7 9
(8 via fear)
4. Pride . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 .40 .37 . . . 7 6 7 6 8
(7 via fear)
5. Self-reproach . . . . . . . . . .23 .08 .15 .10 . . . 6 6 3 4
(5 via fear)
6. Anger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35 .01 .05 .14 .19 . . . 2 2 3
7. Rage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32 .01 .07 .10 .20 .68 . . . 3 3
8. Fear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64 .13 .10 .13 .48 .63 .52 . . . 1
9. Distress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69 .12 .02 .03 .40 .49 .46 .82 . . .
Note.—Each remoteness is computed from its corresponding correlation (r) by the formula , where is 1 if r is10 # (1  {sign(r) # sqrt[abs(r)]}) sign(r)
positive, 1 if r is negative, and 0 if r is zero. Shortest paths were determined with a Javascript program provided at Dijkstra’s Algorithm (n.d.). Retrieved
March 23, 2002 from http://www.tutor.ms.unimelb.edu.au/dijkstra/dp_frame.html. Lower triangle shows correlations; upper triangle shows remoteness plus
shortest paths through intervening emotions.
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relationship with parents to fear of sex), the preferred outcome of such
work was to replace distress, fear, or anger with some form of emotional
well-being (e.g., contentment, happiness, or joy). The psychodrama group
leaders often tried to move participants from more subdued to more
heightened feeling states (e.g., from anger to rage or from fear to panic),
and then to feelings of pride, which provided a relatively simple pathway
to well-being.
Francis (1997) documented identity transformations that group leaders
tried to create among participants in emotion management groups. For
example, participants entered the Discovery Divorce Group because of
feelings of distress, fear, anger, and self-reproach, and the leader made
an effort to normalize their feelings by changing sentiments about three
designated actors in divorce—self, others (mainly the ex-spouse), and God.
While Francis focused on identity work, our complementary perspective
emphasizes that scripted transactions among the specified actors offer
emotional pathways between distress and tranquility. Moreover, remote-
ness indexes in table 5 suggest that a given script will be differentially
successful: for example, achieving tranquility through hope works for
those who are distressed, afraid, or guilty, while those who come into the
group angry would be helped more by engendering pride.
Francis’s (1997) study of the Rebirth Grief Group for surviving spouses
found that many participants entered the group with a perception of the
deceased as a good person who had been torn away involuntarily. The
bereaved also tended to see themselves as having watched the death
helplessly or having failed the deceased in some way. “From her thera-
peutic perspective, Lydia [the leader] attempts to move the bereaved out
of this perception and into the more empowering (but problematic) stage
of anger” (Francis 1997, p. 161). According to our remoteness indices, the
pathway from distress to anger and then to tranquility is much shorter
than the direct pathway from distress to tranquility, and that fact justifies
the leader’s strategy. The leader also attempted to transform the deceased
from victim to abandoner, but this seemed a less successful strategy than
getting participants to ameliorate guilt over having failed the deceased
(Francis 1997, p. 162). This accords with remoteness indices showing that
the direct pathways between self-reproach and tranquility are shorter than
those between distress and tranquility.
Britt and Heise (2000), focusing on stigmatized social identities of being
black and gay or lesbian, found that social movement organizations
(SMOs) routinely generate intervening states of fear and anger in order
to transform shame into pride. Our measures of remoteness suggest that
the SMOs’ strategy is superfluous since shame readily can be turned to
pride without moving through fear and anger first. Thus Britt and Heise
(2000) may have misinterpreted the significance of the shame-fear-anger-
American Journal of Sociology
1126
pride sequence that they discovered. The sequence of emotions may be
necessary to accomplish the collective social action that changes the cul-
tural meaning of the stigmatized identity. It is anger that gets individuals
into the streets. Then, marching en masse does engender pride. But ad-
ditionally—and of equal importance to SMOs—collective demonstrations
socially empower and legitimate the symbol that the marchers represent.
Our remoteness index may also reveal why SMOs bother with the seem-
ingly self-defeating creation of fear. The path from self-reproach to fear
to anger is shorter (a remoteness of “5”), and easier to accomplish, than
is the direct path from self-reproach to anger (a remoteness of “6”).
Although existing literature on emotion management concentrates on
the creation of pleasant emotions, there is a small body of qualitative and
experimental studies that suggest individuals may use similar strategies
to invoke anger or rage in themselves (Hochschild 1983; Stenross and
Kleinman 1989; Sutton 1991)—in other words to move purposely from
pleasant emotional states to unpleasant ones. Moreover, Goffman’s studies
of asylums (1961) revealed that institutional actors induce compliance in
inmates by evoking anger, fear, and shame. Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison
experiment (Haney and Zimbardo 1976) showed that college students
merely pretending to be prison guards created anger, fear, and ultimately
distress in their prisoners in order to engender docility.
Thus, emotional shortcuts between negative and positive emotions can
be, should be, and in fact are utilized in individual, therapeutic, and
institutional attempts at emotion management. Scheff’s (1979, 1988, 2001)
detailed examination of the intertwining of pride and self-reproach (shame
in particular) also is buttressed by our measure of remoteness—a value
of 7—indicating that these two emotions are experientially close.
Sex differences.—We separated the sexes in a multiple-group confirm-
atory factor analysis and found a significant drop in chi-square (P !
, indicating that the factor loadings or factor correlations differ for.001)
men and women . The structure of factor loadings(N p 597) (N p 764)
is basically the same across sexes. The factor loadings for women in the
multiple-group analysis are all within 0.10 of those shown in table 4, and
the factor loadings for men are all within 0.20 with just one exception:
the factor loading of ashamed on the self-reproach factor is 0.58 for men,
as opposed to the loading for women of 1.21. Notwithstanding the dif-
ference, the structure is the same because shame is a substantial com-
ponent of the self-reproach factor for both sexes.
The difference between the factor models for men and women comes
predominately from correlations among factors. The self-reproach factor
is especially interesting in this respect because of its more positive cor-
relations with other emotion factors for men compared to women. For
instance, the correlation of self-reproach with anger is 0.53 for men, and
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0.19 for women; and with pride the correlation is 0.19 for men, 0.04 for
women. Some other sex differences in correlations of emotion factors also
are notable. Pride correlates positively with distress for men (0.18) but
there is zero correlation for women. Hope (measured by feeling excited)
correlates positively with rage for men (0.08), but negatively for women
(0.06).
These sex differences in emotion correlations suggest that emotional
segueing differs for men and women—an idea that might have important
implications for practitioners of social support and emotion therapy. For
example, transformations between self-reproach and anger appear to be
easier for men than for women; a direct path evidently exists from distress
to pride for men, but not for women. And rage can turn into hope-
excitement for men, though that is less likely for women. Such differences
suggest that social support and emotion therapy must be sex specific, or
at least gender conscious, in order to be effective.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Three dimensions emerged in our multidimensional scaling of emotion
experiences, interpretable as pleasantness versus unpleasantness, domi-
nance versus vulnerability, and activation versus quiescence. These three
experiential dimensions parallel the EPA dimensions of affective meaning
that are foundational in affect control theory, and specific emotions have
approximately the same relative positions in the experiential space as in
the meaning space. This isomorphism favors a motif in affect control
theory—and in symbolic interactionism generally—that symbolic pro-
cesses index embodied performances. At least we know now that the
meaning space underlying emotion norms corresponds to the experiential
space for tracking actual emotionality.
We scored individuals’ recent emotional experiences on the three di-
mensions to explore correlates of recurrent emotionality, or emotional
station. As expected, all three dimensions of emotional station relate both
to structural position—assessed in terms of age, sex, and socioeconomic
status—and to variable circumstances such as illness or crowding. We
also found that emotional station correlates with a variety of individu-
alistic behaviors and opinions. The correlations are modest in size, but
they support viewing emotionalities as observable phenomena that reg-
ister social structure, social conditions, and social trends.
Our confirmatory factor analysis turned up nine primary kinds of ex-
perienced emotion—tranquility, hope, joy, pride, self-reproach, anger,
rage, fear, distress—and varying levels of correlation among these emo-
tions. For example, tranquility correlates positively with joy, hope, and
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pride, and correlates negatively with the unpleasant emotions of distress,
fear, anger, rage, and self-reproach, a finding that is consistent with the
notion that negative and positive emotions are associated with different
regions of the brain (Davidson and Irwin 2000; Davidson et al. 2000;
Schaefer et al. 2002). Some opposite emotions, however, correlate posi-
tively—for example, self-reproach with pride—and we construe these
seemingly anomalous correlations as identifying shortcuts from negative
to positive emotionality.23 Our segueing index, based on the correlations,
allows optimal paths for emotion change to be identified—sequences of
emotion that are easier to accomplish than going directly from the be-
ginning emotion to the end emotion.
Reviewing some qualitative studies revealed that therapists routinely
use optimal paths in their interpersonal emotion management efforts, even
to the point of instigating negative emotions in order to push clients
through the shortest transitional paths. Identity transformations instigated
by social support groups and social movement organizations parallel emo-
tion pathways that are relatively easy to achieve. Authorities in custodial
institutions and in resocialization programs (like military basic training)
also use optimal paths for emotion management, such as from pride to
shame, in order to hasten their charges’ progression toward docility.
Our analyses contribute both to affect control theory and to emotion
management theory using the same data and in the process raise a new
question. Are the analyses, the results, and the theories somehow
interrelated?
The two methodologies employed—multidimensional scaling and con-
firmatory factor analysis—have an important parallelism in our analyses.
Both methods analyze the correlations between the emotion variables,24
with each method providing its own tactic for dealing with knots of
particularly large correlations. Multidimensional scaling loosens such
knots by taking account of just the relative magnitudes of correlations in
order to infer distances within a multidimensional space. Confirmatory
factor analysis aggregates knotted variables into new latent variables
whose correlations with other variables are relatively low. Understanding
the methodologies thusly implies that their results must be comparable
to some degree.
To check for comparability, we regressed the segueing indices in table
5 (which are mathematical transformations of the factor-analysis results)
23 In the burgeoning field of brain science, scholars have begun exploring the neural
pathways implicated in emotion regulation; to date, these studies have focused pri-
marily on reducing negative affect in laboratory settings (Gross 1999; Ochsner et al.
2002).
24 See n. 5 above.
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on distances between primary emotions in the three-dimensional space
defined by the first three numerical columns of table 1.25 Allowing for
curvilinearity, the regressions reveal very strong relationships, with
for the regression of segueing indices on male emotion distances,2R p 0.88
and for the regression on female emotion distances.26 The im-2R p 0.90
plications are that the three-dimensions of affect control theory can be
used to derive segueing indices for emotion management theory and that
emotion management processes must be accountable in affect control the-
ory, even though affect control theory currently does not deal with emotion
management. Thus these two important theories in the sociology of emo-
tions evidently can be integrated.
Hochschild’s analyses focus on the relationship between emotion and
social position as a function of adherence to social norms regarding emo-
tion. Integration with affect control theory suggests that emotion norms
relate to identity processes, perhaps as described by Heise and Calhan
(1995). Affect control theorists argue that individuals occupy identities,
participate in events, and experience consequent emotions. Integration
with emotion management theory suggests that emotion whirlpools some-
times arise in these processes, and that emerging from the whirlpools often
is a difficult task that has to be achieved by focusing on emotions rather
than identities. Elaboration of such prospects for theoretical integration
must be deferred to future work.
Sex differences exist in the degree to which pairs of emotions are ex-
perienced concurrently,27 and these differences influenced our scaling and
factor analyses, with the two different methods providing somewhat dif-
ferent emphases. Our scaling analyses revealed that distress and anger
are closer for women than for men, while our factor analyses indicated
that men can move between self-reproach and anger more easily than
women can. Thus optimal paths of emotion transition evidently differ for
men and women, and optimal strategies of emotion management might
be somewhat different for the sexes, too.
Substantial theoretical developments occurred in the sociology of emo-
tions over the past few decades, and in this article we employed two of
the resulting theories as sociological lenses for analyzing survey data on
25 The highest loading indicator of each primary emotion in the last column of table
5 served as the marker of each primary emotion in the three-dimensional space. For
example, the distance between tranquility and fear was measured as the distance
between at-ease and worried.
26 The transformation equations are for men,2S p 3.47  2.43D  2.64D S p 2.52 
for women, where S represents segueing indices and D represents20.64D  2.36D
emotion distances.
27 Also app. A shows that females are prone to significantly lower frequencies of pleas-
ant emotional experiences than males.
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emotion experiences. By approaching the data repeatedly, each time from
a different theoretical perspective, we showed that a single body of data
on emotions tells multiple stories about social life—for example, about
the correlation of emotional station with a variety of structural, circum-
stantial, and personal variables and about ways to provide social support
to individuals in emotional traps. Additionally, we provide insight into
the strategies that organizations use in order to facilitate member behav-
ior; specifically, our analysis illustrates that social movement organizations
may purposefully instill the seemingly self-defeating emotion of fear in
individual members so that they may more easily reap the collective made
possible through anger and pride. Finally, this article has developed mul-
tiple measures for survey data on emotions that can help advance other
research agendas within the sociology of emotions, as well as research




Number of Days in the Last Week that Specific Emotions Were Felt by
Respondents
N Mean SD Skew*
Felt that you couldn’t shake the blues?†
Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 631 1.06 1.77 1.95
Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 1.33 1.89 1.66
Felt calm?†
Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 632 4.80 2.31 .66
Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 4.39 2.37 .41
Felt outraged at something somebody had done?
Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 633 1.48 1.85 1.59
Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 1.52 1.89 1.50
Felt happy?
Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 636 5.34 2.02 1.03
Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 5.21 2.07 .94
Felt sad†
Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 633 1.42 1.83 1.56
Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 1.81 1.98 1.29
Felt ashamed of something you’d done?
Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 634 0.47 1.11 3.83
Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 0.47 1.17 3.63
Felt excited about or interested in something?†
Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 636 3.80 2.25 .05
Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 3.45 2.36 .19
Felt lonely?†
Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 634 1.28 2.06 1.69
Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 1.67 2.30 1.30
Felt fearful about something that might happen to
you?
Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 632 1.06 1.80 2.07
Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 1.26 2.05 1.77
Felt overjoyed about something?
Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 631 1.91 2.28 1.07
Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813 1.68 2.02 1.30
Worried a lot about little things?†
Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 634 2.43 2.59 .69
Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 3.12 2.78 .32
Felt contented?
Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 629 4.51 2.54 .56
Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 4.59 2.40 .62
Felt anxious and tense?
Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 631 2.20 2.22 .90
Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 2.30 2.29 .83
Felt mad at something or someone?
Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 633 1.76 1.99 1.31
Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816 1.60 1.87 1.41
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TABLE A1 (Continued)
N Mean SD Skew*
Felt at ease?
Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 634 4.67 2.37 .58
Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 4.46 2.37 .48
Felt angry at someone?
Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 634 1.52 1.82 1.56
Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817 1.46 1.77 1.59
Felt embarrassed about something?
Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 635 .63 1.28 3.12
Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815 .57 1.17 3.35
Felt proud of something you’d done?†
Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 633 3.21 2.35 .32
Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809 2.81 2.34 .58
* All absolute values of skew are double their SEs, except for the skew of excited for men.





Correlations among Frequencies of Emotional Experiences
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1. Calm . . . .49 .45 .43 .10 .15 .11 .09 .08 .16 .38* .45* .31* .32 .24* .24* .29* .26*
2. At ease .48 . . . .58 .50 .19 .31 .15 .13 .09 .19 .32 .36 .25 .39 .29* .24 .25 .23
3. Contented .37 .53 . . . .54 .19 .26 .19 .11 .10 .18 .33 .31 .32 .39 .31* .26* .27 .23
4. Happy .44 .52 .48 . . . .20 .36 .20 .05 .07 .20 .28 .25 .39 .52 .35* .25* .22 .21
5. Overjoyed .17 .16 .15 .26 . . . .43 .36 .10 .14 .13 .01 .06 .02 .02 .01 .07 .02 .06
6. Excited .21 .24 .25 .32 .45 . . . .35* .05 .07 .06 .06 .00 .02 .15 .04 .01 .04* .01*
7. Proud .07 .14 .15 .20 .39 .44* . . . .06 .08 .14 .02* .07 .01 .01 .00 .11 .11 .08
8. Embarrassed .16 .12 .08 .13 .11 .10 .11 . . . .48 .21 .16 .23 .18* .22 .17 .20* .21* .12*
9. Ashamed .03 .12 .15 .10 .09 .06 .03 .45 . . . .26 .13 .20 .21* .19 .11 .13 .17* .13
10. Fearful .26 .25 .23 .24 .06 .01 .09 .28 .26 . . . .31 .35 .26 .33 .29 .23 .26 .27*
11. Worried .22* .27 .30 .23 .10 .00 .13* .23 .19 .33 . . . .52* .35 .40 .28 .37 .38 .32
12. Anxious-tense .31* .31 .29 .25 .10 .10 .15 .26 .24 .42 .42* . . . .36 .41 .28 .39 .41 .34
13. Sad .17* .26 .28 .32 .08 .01 .05 .33* .32* .34 .31 .41 . . . .54 .46 .42* .36 .37
14. Blues .26 .35 .37 .50 .06 .21 .00 .24 .25 .38 .36 .36 .52 . . . .48 .34* .35 .31
15. Lonely .09* .15* .15* .20* .02 .04 .08 .23 .20 .22 .21 .26 .41 .44 . . . .28 .28 .22
16. Angry .12* .17 .13* .11* .11 .09 .16 .32* .18 .29 .30 .39 .33* .19* .18 . . . .81* .57*
17. Mad .18* .26 .21 .17 .06 .10* .12 .32* .28* .32 .35 .46 .35 .27 .21 .74* . . . .57*
18. Outraged .15* .16 .16 .13 .16 .12* .16 .23* .14 .38* .26 .39 .30 .21 .21 .68* .66* . . .
Note.—Correlations are significantly different from zero at the .05 level if the absolute value is 0.07 or more for women and 0.08 for men. Men are in lower
triangle ; women, in upper triangle .(N p 600) (N p 766)
* Differ significantly by sex at the .05 level in a two-tail test based on Student’s t after Fisher’s r to z transformation (Winkler and Hays 1975, p. 653).
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